Financial stability and the design of monetary policy by García Herrero, Alicia & Río López, Pedro del
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO
FINANCIAL STABILITY
AND
THE DESIGN OF
MONETARY POLICY
Documento de Trabajo n.º 0315
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS
and Pedro del Río
Alicia García Herrero
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND 
 THE DESIGN OF 
MONETARY POLICY (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Documento de Trabajo nº 0315 
 
Alicia García Herrero and Pedro del Río (2)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) This is a revised version of a paper which received the Marjolin Prize at the 24th SUERF Colloquium in  
Tallin, June 2003, and the first "3rd Journées" prize of the Foundation Banque de France in November 
2003. The paper has benefited from comments from Roberto Chang, Martti Randveer and José Viñals. 
Holger Wolf also offered substantial comments to a very preliminary version of the paper. Remaining 
errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
 (2) Both authors are affiliated with Banco de España. However, the opinions expressed are those of the 
authors and not of the institution they represent. Corresponding author: aligarcia-herrero@bde.es.  
 
 
 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. 
 All papers have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España 
 aims to contribute to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy 
 and its international environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most 
of its publications via the INTERNET at the following 
 website: http://www.bde.es 
 
 
 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted 
provided that the source is acknowledged 
 
 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2003 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (online) 
Depósito legal: M. 55149-2003
Imprenta del Banco de España  
Abstract 
This paper builds upon the existing empirical literature on the factors behind financial 
stability, focusing on the role of monetary policy design. In particular, it analyzes a sample 
of 79 countries in the period 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the effect of the choice of the central 
bank objectives and the monetary policy strategy on the occurrence of banking crises. We 
find that focusing the central bank objectives on price stability reduces the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. This result is robust, in general, to several model specifications and groups of 
countries. As for the monetary policy strategy, the results are less clear. For a few model 
specifications, particularly for the group of countries in transition, the choice of an exc hange 
rate-based strategy appears to reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. Finally, a large 
degree of independence of the central bank and locating regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities at the central bank seem to reduce the likelihood of a bankin g crisis. 
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1 INTRODUCCION 
The relation between monetary policy and financial stability has been long debated but there 
is still no clear consensus on how one affects the other and, in particular, whether there are 
trade-offs or synergies between them. This issue clearly deserves further attention, since it 
could help devise arrangements and policy responses to promote both monetary and 
financial stability. 
We look into the role of the monetary policy design, in particular the choice of the central 
bank objectives and the monetary policy strategy, in fostering financial stability. Among the 
different aspects of financial instability, we choose banking crisis events, following the 
existing literature. More specifically, we assess empirically whether countries  whose central 
banks focus narrowly on price stability are less prone to banking crises, other things given. 
In the same vein, we test which monetary policy strategy (exchange rate based, money or 
inflation targeting), if any, reduces the likelihood of banking crises. 
The motivation for focusing on the monetary policy design as a potential factor contributing 
to financial stability stems from the encouragingly growing literature on the role of 
institutions and policy design. In the case of financial stability, the rationale behind is that an 
appropriate policy design should foster a better credit culture and an effective market 
functioning. The design of monetary policy should be particularly important since the central 
bank has a natural role in ensuring financial stability, as argued by Padoa-Schioppa (2002)3 
and Schinasi (2003), and has virtually always been involved in financial stability, directly or 
indirectly4. 
                                                  
3 In his words, “the issue of financial stability was part of the central banks’ genetic code”. 
4 At the beginning, the stability issue arose because the issuers of banknotes were profit-maximizing commercial banks, who had incentives to 
print more notes than they could back with holdings of gold and silver, or with deposits of government bonds. This led to “wildcat” banks that heavily
engaged in over-issuance (Gorton, 1999).  For a description of the role of central banks in financial stability across regimes see Borio and Lowe (2002). 
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2 THE CONCEPT AND MEAS UREMENT OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The concept of financial stability 
Financial stability is an elusive concept to define, as proven by the fact that practically no 
explicit definition exists and most often the opposite concept, financial instability, is used5. 
The main reason for this difficulty is that, at first sight, “stability” is associated with no 
volatility while volatility is not necessarily bad for financial markets6. 
Haldane, Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) offer a very general definition of financial stability, 
related to the economy’s saving-investment nexus. Deviations from the optimal 
saving-investment plan may arise because of inefficiencies in the functioning of the financial 
system or from instabilities in the system in the face of shocks. Financial instability is often 
used synonymously to asset price volatility, which takes prices far away from their 
fundamental level, finally reversing suddenly and producing a “crash” [Bernanke and Gertler 
(2000), Crockett (2000)]. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) concentrate on financial fragility, as a 
situation in which potential borrowers have low wealth relative to the size of their projects. 
Such a low insider’s stake increases the agency problems and exacerbates frictions in the 
credit market (balance sheet channel). In the same line, Crockett (1997) defines financial 
stability as the absence of stresses that have the potential to cause measurable economic 
harm beyond a strictly limited group of customers and counterparties. All these conceptual 
definitions lack a clear benchmark to separate situations of stability from those of instability. 
The usual way to do it is based on deviations from the mean [Kaminsky and Reinhart, (1999)] 
or from a trend [Borio and Lowe, (2002)]. 
                                                  
5 Recently, Padoa-Schioppa (2002) has offered a working definition of financial stability, namely “a condition where the financial system is able to 
withstand shocks without giving way to cumulative processes which impairs the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the processing 
of payments in the economy”. However, as in the other cases, financial stability is defined in terms of financial instability rather than explicitly. 
6 As Schinasi (2003) explains, even stable markets can have high volatility in asset prices. Issing (2003) goes even further arguing that large 
swings in asset prices leading to some failures of financial institutions could even be a sign of stability or of self-purifying powers of the system. The 
question is, thus, when is volatility so large that it creates systemic damage to the system and the real economy. 
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Another strand of the literature focuses on extreme realizations of financial instability. 
According to Mishkin (1996) a financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which 
adverse selection and moral hazard become much worse, so that financial markets are unable 
to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. 
A very different definition of a financial crisis is given by Bordo et al. (1995) where a real 
-as opposed to pseudo- financial crisis is a flight to cash because of the perception that no 
institution will supply the necessary liquidity. These different definit ions reflect the 
opposing theories concerning the causes of financial crises: asymmetric information in the 
former and monetary developments in the latter. In any case, both definitions include the 
danger of a failure of financial and/or non-financial firms. 
The empirical literature concentrates on this second type of definitions (i.e., referring to 
financial crises) since extreme realizations are easier to ident ify than more general measures. 
The disadvantage, though, is that situations of moderate financial instability are not included 
in these empirical studies. 
How to measure financial instability?: The role of banking crises 
Among the different aspects of financial crises, banking crises have received special 
attention given the crucial role that banks play in most financial systems, particularly in 
emerging countries. Other types of financial crises analyzed are currency crises and asset 
price crashes. We are particularly interested in banking crises, as a financial stability 
outcome, because the design of the central bank is more directly related to the functioning of 
the banking system than to the rest of the financial system. This does not mean that currency 
crises or asset price crashes are totally excluded from the analysis. Financial institutions are 
particularly sensitive to abrupt asset price declines because of their negative net worth 
effects on banks’ borrowers or, directly, on banks’ balance sheets [Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1988)]. Currency crises also affect them indirectly (through the impact  on banks’ 
borrowers) and directly depending on the bank’s currency position [Kaminsky and Reinhart 
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(1999)]. In any event, given the importance of the topic, it seems worth extending this 
research to other aspects of financial instability in the future. Obvious candidates are 
currency crises, excessive volatility in asset prices and general financial fragility. While the 
former is an extreme realization and, thus, easier to measure, the others need a subjective 
definition of what is considered excessive volatility7 and what is meant by fragility. 
The literature offers several definitions of banking crises. From the early definitions of 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Bordo (1986), who concentrate on bank panics, more 
general definitions have followed (see Table A for a summary of many definitions). 
Lindgren et al. (1996) focus on unsoundness, shown in high inefficiency, low earnings and 
capitalization, and leading to banking crises. Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) define a banking 
crisis as a situation where actual or incipient bank runs or failures lead to suspend the 
internal convertibility of their liabilities or force the government to intervene to avert this by 
replacing a significant share of the banks’ capital. Gupta (1996) describes a banking crisis as 
a situation in which a significant group of financial institutions have liabilities exceeding the 
market value of their assets, leading to portfolio shifts or to deposit runs and/or the collapse 
of financial institutions and/or government intervention. Under such circumstances, an 
increase in the share of non-performing loans, an increase in financial losses, and a decrease 
in the value of the bank’s investments cause solvency problems and may lead to liquidations, 
mergers and restructuring of the banking. More recently, the IMF (1998) has coined a broad 
definition of banking crisis, in which actual or potential bank runs or failures induce banks to 
suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or which compel the government to 
extend assistance to banks on a large scale. Such definitions, except for Lindgren et al.  
(1996), are basically description of a banking crisis. A more complex matter is how to summarize
such description in one single quantitative indicator, or a set of them. Existing indicators, 
such as those mentioned by Lindgren et al. (1996) are not readably available for a large 
                                                 
 
7 See Borio and Lowe (2002) for a review of the trade-offs of monetary authorities reacting to asset price movements and, more generally, to 
financial imbalances. 
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number of countries, or else there is the lack of comparable cross-country data to construct 
such indicator. This is why the empirical literature has opted for identifying banking crises 
as events, expressed through a binary variable, constructed with the help of cross-country 
surveys [Lindgreen et al. (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)]. This will be our approach 
as well. 
 
Table A: Measures of financial instability based on banking crises 
Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) 
Deposit runs 
Lindgren et al. 
(1996) 
High inefficiency, low earnings and capitalization leading to financial unsoundness 
Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1997) 
Actual or incipient bank runs or failures leading to suspend the internal convertibility 
of their liabilities or forcing the government to intervene replacing a significant share 
of the banks’ capital  
Gupta (1996) Liabilities exceeding the market value of their assets, leading to portfolio shifts or to 
deposit runs and/or the collapse of financial institutions and/or government 
intervention 
IMF (1998) Actual or potential bank runs or failures inducing banks to suspend the internal 
convertibility of their liabilities or compelling the government to extend assistance to 
banks on a large scale 
 
3 THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKING CRISES  
The economic literature has mostly concentrated on the macroeconomic determinants of 
financial stability and, to a lesser extent, on the financial sector determinants (see Table B 
for a summary of the literature). Among the macroeconomic factors, low growth or 
recessions have been found to increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. In turn, too high 
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real interest rates (either external or domestic), large capital inflows but also capital flight, 
particularly in the case of emerging countries, and shocks to inflation or to the price level 
also appear to increase the probability of a banking crisis. It should be noted that the last 
factor, inflation, is related to the way monetary policy is conducted, in so far as monetary 
policy aims at price stability. Another macroeconomic variable frequently analyzed, but for 
which there is no consensus, is the exchange rate regime. This is also an important variable 
in our analysis in as far as the monetary policy strategy is based on an exchange rate anchor. 
Among the financial sector determinants, excessive credit growth8 and low levels of 
liquidity in the banking system have been found to increase the likelihood of banking crises. 
As for currency mismatches, there is growing theoretical support but no clear evidence in the 
empirical literature. 
Less –albeit growing– attention has been paid to the impact of institutional variables and 
policy design. The exceptions are the legal system, the deposit insurance scheme and 
financial liberalization. A well-functioning legal system reduces the probability of banking 
crises while a deposit insurance scheme, especially if unlimited and/or implicit increases that 
probability. This is also the case for financial liberalization, particularly when good quality 
regulation and supervision are not in place. 
                                                  
8 Lending booms are often seen as the domestic image of large capital inflows [Gourinchas et al. (2001)]. 
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Table B: Determinants of banking crises 
 
Macroeconomic Impact Literature 
Real GDP growth   - 
- 
Kaminsky (1999) 
Frankel and Rose (1998) 
External real interest rates  + 
+ 
+ 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) 
Eichengreen and Rose (1998) 
Kaminsky (1999) 
Domestic real interest rates  + 
+ 
Mishkin (1998) 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
Large capital inflows  + McKinnon and Pill (1994) 
Capital outflows or capital flight + 
+ 
+ 
Calvo (1997) 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
Kaminsky (1999) 
Inflation + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Bordo and Murshid (2000)  
English (1996) 
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
Fixed exchange rate regime +/- 
 
- 
+/- 
Eichengreen (1998): + if outside shock, - if threat to 
stability from inside 
Domaç and Martínez Peria (2000): but with higher 
cots when crisis occurs 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) 
Financial    
Growth of bank credit to the private 
sector 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Gavin and Hausmann (1996) 
Sachs et al. (1996) 
Kaminsky (1999) 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) 
Liquidity in the banking system - 
- 
- 
Calvo (1997) 
Bordo et al (2001) 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) 
Currency mismatches + 
+/- 
Céspedes et al. (2000) 
Arteta (2003) 
Institutional    
Rule of law - La Porta et al. (1998) 
Deposit insurance scheme  +   Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) 
Financial liberalization + 
+ 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) 
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In this paper, we focus on the design of monetary policy. The exis ting literature on monetary 
policy design has concentrated on issues different than financial stability (mainly price 
stability but also output stabilization). In particular, it is well documented that a high degree 
of central bank independence and an explicit mandate to restrain inflation are important 
institutional devices to ensure price stability [Berger, Haan and Eijffinger (2001)]. The role 
of the monetary policy strategy chosen is less clear even for price stability and output 
stabilization although inflation targeting has received more support in the recent literature 9. 
There is some empirical analysis, albeit still scarce, on the reverse issue, namely the impact 
of financial instability, and in particular of banking crises, on a country’s monetary p olicy. In 
particular, García Herrero (1997) and Martinez Peria (2000) find empirical evidence that 
money demand is stable in the long run in countries having experienced systemic banking 
crises. García Herrero (1997) also reviews seven case studies regarding the impact of 
banking crises on monetary policy, which includes the strategy and instruments, and reports 
that banking crises do not necessarily lead to substantial changes in the monetary policy 
design. These results are important because they weaken somewhat the endogeneity problem 
we face in this study. To the best of our knowledge, no study is available on the reverse 
causality. 
The impact of the monetary policy design on financial stability is related to the very much 
debated question of the relation between price stability and financial stability. The economic 
literature is divided as to whether there are synergies or a trade-off between them. If 
synergies existed between the two objectives it would seem safe to argue that the same monetary 
policy design which helps achieve price stability (namely, narrow central bank objectives 
and central bank independence) also fosters financial stability. However, if there were a 
                                                  
9 In terms of macroeconomic performance, however, it is hard to argue that inflation targeting is clearly superior [Ball and Sheridan (2003)]. 
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trade-off, it would be much harder to establish an a-priori on the impact of price stability on 
financial stability. 
Among the arguments for a trade-off, Mishkin (1996) argues that high level of interest rates, 
necessary to control inflation, negatively affect banks’ balance sheets and firms’ net 
financial worth, especially if they attract capital inflows. This is because capital inflows 
contribute to over-borrowing and increase credit risk, and may lead to currency mismatches 
if foreign capital flows are converted into domestic-currency denominated loans. Cukierman 
(1992) states that the inflation control may require fast and substantial increases in interest 
rates, which banks cannot pass as quickly to their assets as to their liabilities. This increases 
interest rate mismatches and, thus, market risk. Another type of trade-off stems from too low 
inflation or deflation, which reduces banks’ profit margins and, by damaging borrowers (and 
not lenders as inflation) increases the amount of non performing loans in banks’ balance 
sheets [Fisher (1933)]. 
Among the arguments for synergies between price and financial stability, Schwartz (1995), 
states that credibly maintained prices provide the economy with an environment of 
predictable interest rates, leading to a lower risk of interest rate mismatches, minimizing the 
inflation risk premium in long-term interest rates and, thus, contributing to financial 
soundness. From this strong view of synergies, where price stability is practically considered 
a sufficient condition for financial stability, some more cautious supporters of the 
“synergies” view argue that price stability is a necessary condition for financial stability but 
not a sufficient one [Padoa-Schioppa (2002) and Issing (2003)]. 
In this discussion of synergies versus trade-offs, it is important to note that the focus is on 
outcomes (i.e., on the achievement of price and financial stability) while this paper focuses 
on a different –albeit related– issue: the institutional design of monetary policy. In fact, the 
design might focus on price stability but inflation may remain high. We shall control for 
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developments in inflation –and growth, a relevant objective for some central banks– but such 
outcome variables do not constitute the objective of this study. 
4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This paper builds upon the existing literature on how to foster financial stability, focusing on 
the role of monetary policy design. In particular, it assesses empirically whether the choice 
of the central bank objectives and the monetary policy strategy affects financial stability. 
Monetary policy design can have important implications for financial stability. Central banks 
are providers of immediate liquidity and responsible for the smooth functioning of the 
payment system and that of the transmission mechanism. The central bank is also in charge 
of price stability and, sometimes, output stabilization, both relevant for financial stability. 
The monetary policy objectives and strategies are the main tools the central bank has to 
perform its functions, so they will necessarily influence financial stability, directly or 
indirectly10.  In fact, if the central bank design leads to a too lax monetary policy, inflation 
will tend to be more volatile. Positive inflation surprises redistribute real wealth from lenders
to borrowers and negative inflation surprises have the opposite effect. Redistribution in
either direction –although even more so in the latter case- may provoke bankruptcy, with 
serious implications for the quality of banks' loans. In addition, a very tight monetary policy 
leading to very low inflation levels and, thereby, very low interest rates, makes cash holdings 
more attractive than interest-bearing bank deposits. This may induce disintermediation and, 
thereby, financial instability. On the other hand, if a tight monetary policy does not manage 
to bring down inflation and real interest rates remain high, financial stability might be at risk. 
Sharp increases in real interest rates may also have adverse effects on the balance sheets of 
banks and even bring about a credit crunch. From these arguments, it seems hard to establish 
                                                  
 
10 Padoa-Schioppa (2002) argues that financial stability considerations are taken into account when designing the central bank objectives and 
strategy. 
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an a priori on the implications of monetary policy design for financial stability. To make 
matters even more complicated, there could be instances in which the direction of causality 
is the opposite. That is, where financial instability -or banking crises in particular– lead to 
changes in the design of monetary policy either because the problem is very large or because 
the monetary policy authorities want to adapt to avoid future crises. More generally, while 
fragile banking systems may be a consequence of wrong central bank policies in the past, 
that fragility may oblige central banks to adjust their design to those circumstances. 
Admittedly, such endogeneity problem is inherent to our analysis. Section 7 explains how 
we attempt to account for it. 
 The central bank objectives and the way to achieve them –the monetary policy strategy – are 
crucial elements of the monetary policy design, determining the focus of the central bank 
and the stance of its monetary policy. We shall, thus, concentrate on these two aspects in our 
empirical study. Another important aspect is the degree of central bank independence, which 
clearly influences how much room central banks have to stick to their objectives. 
Since their creation, central banks have moved back and forth in the  objectives they have 
targeted. In the last decade, the trend has been towards narrowing down the central bank 
objectives to a single one, price stability, or at least to a set of objectives considered to be 
compatible with price stability (see Figure 1). However, many other situations still exist: 
some central banks aim at price stability together with other –  in principle non-compatible– 
objectives; others do not include price stability at all in their list of objectives or do not have 
clearly specified objectives. 
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The trend towards a greater focus on price stability in the central bank objectives is 
explained by the conviction -based on the theoretical and empirical literature- that it 
contributes to price stability. However, not much is known about its effect on financial 
stability. This is partly due to the previously reviewed lack of consensus whether synergies  
-or a trade-off- exist between price and financial stability. If synergies exist, a central bank 
focusing on price stability should be able to promote financial stability, as well as price 
stability. However, if there is a trade-off, a central bank with multiple objectives should be 
able to take this trade-off better into account. 
As regards the choice of the monetary policy strategy, there is a wealth of literature on the 
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy for achieving price stability but no clear 
Figure 1: Distribution of central bank objectives by 
decades
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E
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consensus on which one is preferred, at least in a long enough time span. Furthermore, no 
evidence exists on how it may affect financial stability. While the choice of the monetary 
strategy will mainly depend on its relation with the central bank’s main objective (the 
inflation outcome or sometimes the macroeconomic performance) –on the basis that one 
instrument should serve one objective– it is still interesting to know whether there are 
spill-overs from the choice of the strategy towards financial stability. 
When compared with the central bank objectives, the reasons why the choice of the 
monetary policy strategy can affect financial stability are less clear-cut. Perhaps the most 
debated case is the exchange-rate based strategy. Domaç and Martinez Peria (2000) find that 
fixed exchange rate regimes, and implicitly an exchange rate-based monetary strategy, are 
preferred to reduce the likelihood of banking crises among developing countries. However, 
Eichengreen (1998) argues that whether fixed or floating exchange rate regimes reduce the 
probability of banking crises depends on the source of disturbances. If the threat to the 
stability of the banking system comes from outside, there is a case for exchange rate 
flexibility (which may translate into a monetary or inflation targeting in terms of the 
monetary policy strategy). Instead, if the threat comes from inside (i.e., erratic monetary 
policies at home), an exchange rate anchor is a better strategy. Finally, Eichengreen and 
Arteta (2000) also find mixed results. In sum, there is hardly any a priori on which strategy 
can better contribute to financial stability. 
A historical overview of the monetary policy strategies adopted over time in our sample 
shows that the number of central banks with direct inflation targeting strategies has surged 
from close to zero at the end of the 1980s to over 50 today (see Figure 2). The number of 
central banks targeting a monetary aggregate has also grown albeit less rapidly; they are 
nearly 40 today. It is important to note that many of the central banks targeting money have 
an additional target in their monetary policy strategy, usually inflation targeting. The most 
obvious cases are the twelve euro countries, included separately in our exercise. On the 
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contrary, central banks with an exchange rate anchor are less than 40 today from over 50 in 
the mid 1990s. This corresponds with a certain degree of disenchantment with fixed 
exchange rates, after the Mexican and Asian crises. The information available also shows 
that there is a growing number of central banks with more than one target in its monetary 
policy strategy. This could be understood as a growing preference for a certain degree of 
flexibility. 
As an additional aspect of the monetary policy design, we introduce central bank 
independence. The rationale behind is that the government may interfere in the central 
bank’s pursuing its objectives if the central bank is  not independent. The a priori for the 
impact of central bank independence on financial stability should, therefore, follow the same 
reasoning as for the central bank objectives. If synergies exist, a high degree of central bank 
independence, which has been proved to foster price stability, should also contribute to 
financial stability. 
 Finally, we will control for the location of regulation and supervision responsibilities, being 
closely related to the institutional design and in many cases, to the central bank functions. 
Again, there is no consensus view on which location (central bank or separate agency) is 
better to avoid banking crises although many more efforts have been devoted to this question 
than to the role of the monetary policy design. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of monetary policy strategies
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5 VARIAB LE DEFINITIONS AND DATA 
We now describe the definitions chosen for our dependent variable, financial instability, and 
the objective variables (mainly, the central bank objectives and the monetary policy strategy) 
as well as the source of the data. Finally, the choice of the control variables is also briefly 
described. A detailed account of the sources and construction of all variables can be found in 
the Appendix. 
Among the different definitions given to financial instability, we concentrate on its extreme 
realization, namely a crisis event. We choose banking crises, and not currency or twin crises, 
as banks are the major player in most countries’ financial system and are most directly 
influenced by the central bank. 
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To account for banking crises, we use existing surveys of crisis events and identify periods 
of systemic and non-systemic crises according to the information and chronology of 
episodes provided by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Domaç and Martinez Peria (2000). 
We choose these surveys because they are the most comprehensive and updated ones. We 
check for potential inconsistencies between the two, and when they exist, we support our 
choice with other sources (such as IMF staff reports, and financial news). We also follow the 
authors’ definition of a systemic banking crisis as the situation when a large part of the 
banking system is affected by the crisis, in terms of the number of banks, the share of assets 
or the amount of bank capital lost. Table A2 of the Appendix offers the list of crisis events 
considered, its classification into systemic and non-systemic episodes and their duration. 
We now move to the objective variables, describing the monetary policy design. The first 
summarizes the type of central bank objectives into an index, which follows the approach of 
Cukierman et al. (1992) although with some transformations following Mahadeva and 
Sterne (2000). The index takes a larger value the more narrowly the central bank statutory 
objectives focus on price stability. More specifically, it takes the value of 1 when price 
(or currency) stability is the only, or the main, goal. It takes the value of 0.75 when the price 
stability objective is accompanied by -in principle non-conflicting- objectives, such as 
financial stability. It takes the value of 0.50 when price stability goes together with others 
-in principle conflicting- objectives, such as economic growth and/or employment creation. 
In particular, this is the case when objectives such as employment or growth are stated 
separately without being qualified by statements such as “without prejudice to monetary or 
price stability”. Finally, the index takes the value of 0.25 when there are no statutory 
objectives and 0 when there are statutory objectives but none of the existing goals is price 
stability11. This index is constructed with the information provided by Cukierman, Webb and 
                                                  
11 We could have used a dummy for each objective or a non-linear index instead of a linear index. However, our goal here is to examine the importance  
of narrow objectives, which is a proxy of how much central banks focus on price stability, rather than on the choice among the many different options.   
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Neyapti (1992), Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and finally Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti 
(2002) in the case of transition countries. The list of objectives for each country is available 
roughly by decades, so we need to assume the index to be constant during a decade with 
some exceptions for which more information could be found on changes in central bank 
objectives, particularly in more recent periods. 
The second objective variable is the monetary policy strategy, which mainly consists of the 
choice of the intermediate variable to achieve the central bank objectives. Strategies are, 
thus, classified into exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting and direct inflation 
targeting. Three dummy variables are created, one for each strategy, which take the value of 
one when the central bank uses that specific strategy and zero otherwise. It should be noted 
that these dummies are not mutually excludable since there are countries whose central 
banks use two different monetary strategies in parallel. 
To construct these dummies, we use information on the monetary policy strategies of 
94 central banks from a survey carried out by the Bank of England in 1999 [Mahadeva and 
Sterne (2000)]. The survey provides a chronology of the adoption and removal of explicit 
targets and monitoring ranges for the exchange rate, monetary aggregates and inflation in the 
1990s. It includes strategies adopted before the 1990s and remaining until this decade, but 
periods with different strategies which ended before the 1990s are missing. Since our 
empirical exercise covers the period 1970 to 1999, we had to complement the data with 
information from other sources. Regarding the exchange rate strategy, we use existing 
classifications of exchange rate regimes, namely, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Berg et al.  
(2002) and Kuttner and Posen (2001), to extract those countries which had exchange rate 
anchors during the 30 year period of interest for us. Data for monetary and direct inflation 
targeting are complemented with information in Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Carare and 
Stone (2003). 
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In order to take into account the degree of independence of the central bank, we include an 
index which measures to what extent the central banks are legally independent according to 
their charters, following the approach of Cukierman et al. (1992). This variable goes from 0 
(least independent) to 1 (most independent) and is taken from Cukierman et al. (1992), for 
the 1970s and 1980s, and from Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Cukierman et al12. (2002) 
for the 1990s. Although many other indexes exist, these have been chosen because they 
cover the largest number of countries for the largest time frame and also because they are 
very similar in their construction 13. In fact, both Cukierman et al. (1992 and 2002) and 
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) clusters include the appointment, dismissal and term of office 
of Governor, the independence in policy formulation, the limitations in lending to the 
government, and the central bank objectives, as components of their central bank 
independence index. Given that the central bank objectives are a component of the 
independence index, we should expect some degree of collinearity between the two 
variables. As in the case of the variable of central bank objectives, the index of independence 
is assumed to be constant through every year of each decade. 
We also want to control for an important institutional variable, the location of bank 
regulation and supervision. This information is taken from a survey conducted by the IMF in 
1993, found in Tuya and Zamalloa (1994), where all member countries where asked to 
inform of which institution was responsible for banking regulation and supervision in their 
respective countries. Unfortunately, no panel information is available on this issue for a long 
enough period of time. 
                                                  
12 This is only available for transition countries. 
13 The construction of central bank independence indices differs widely. Mangano (1998) compares the Cukierman index and the 
Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index and concludes that 45% of the criteria are not regarded as relevant in the second. 
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Finally, we also control for three types of factors, based on the previous review of the 
literature, macroeconomic, financial and institutional ones. Among the macroeconomic 
variables, we take inflation, the real interest rate, the ratio of net capital flows to GDP, the 
growth of real GDP and the level of real GDP per capita, the last as a proxy of a country’s 
institutional framework. The rationale behind the latter is that poorer countries tend to have 
more inefficient legal systems, as well as a weaker enforcement of loan contracts and 
deficient prudential regulations 14. 
While the a priori sign of inflation on the likelihood of banking crisis events is positive, it 
should be noted that a protracted period of price stability has been argued to be problematic 
if it leads to an inappropriate discounting of economic risks due to myopic growth 
expectations in countries which are not used to price stability15. As for real interest rates, 
high levels should hamper financial stability, but too low levels (namely negative) may also 
be detrimental since they reduce banks’ margins and discourage savings. Large capital 
inflows may be harmful in as far as they are intermediated by the banking system and 
converted into rapid loan growth. Outflows, on the other hand, can bring about crises by 
depriving banks of foreign financing and also by heightening the expectation of a meltdown, 
leading to bank runs. The remaining macroeconomic variables (real economic growth and 
real GDP per capita) have a clearer expected sign. First, higher growth should reduce the 
likelihood of a banking crisis through lower non-performing loans and higher savings and, 
thereby, bank deposits. In the same vein, a higher real GDP per capita, reflecting better 
institutions, should reduce banks’ uncertainty regarding the operating environment, 
particularly their right to recover their assets. 
                                                  
14 While there may be more accurate information on the quality of institutions that the GDP per capita, available surveys do not have a time 
dimension. The lack of different observations over time makes these –in principle better– institutional indicators inadequate for our empirical 
analysis. The same is true for other relevant institutional variables, such as the existence of a deposit insurance scheme. 
15 Blinder (1999), Crockett (2000), Viñals (2001) and Borio and Lowe (2002). 
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A number of financial variables are also included as control variables. In particular, the 
growth of domestic credit to the private sector, the banks’ currency mismatch, measured by 
the ratio of their foreign liabilities to foreign assets, and the liquidity of the banking system, 
measured by the ratio of cash to banks assets, which should capture the banks’ ability to deal 
with potential deposit runs. From the literature review, the first, two variables have a positive 
a priori sign and the third a negative one. 
The third set of control variables are institutional ones: the existence of a deposit insurance 
scheme and financial liberalization. Both variables are dummies stemming from different 
surveys and empirical studies (see the appendix for details and sources). Given the risks of 
unlimited deposit insurance systems and disorderly financial liberalizations highlighted in 
the literature, both variables have a positive a priori sign in our analysis. 
6 SOME STYLISED FACTS 
Before embarking in the regression analysis we look at the data properties (see the 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix in Tables 3 and 4 of the Appendix) and show 
some stylized facts. 
Measured by the number of crisis events worldwide, there appears to be a substantial 
increase in financial instability in the 1980s, with respect to the 1970s levels, part icularly in 
emerging countries, a trend which has continued in the 1990s (see Figure 3). The latter is 
mainly due to the larger number of crises that occurred in transition countries in this decade 
and to the additional, albeit marginal, increase in the number of crises in emerging countries. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of crises by decades and countries
(percentage of total crises)
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In order to assess whether the design of monetary policy can affect the likelihood of banking 
crisis events, we conduct a few preliminary exercises before embarking in the econometric 
analysis. We first look at the number of crises which have occurred in the period of study 
(1970-1999) for different country groups, on the basis of their central bank objectives. 
Figure 4 (light-coloured column) shows that those countries whose central bank objectives 
do not include price stability experienced the lowest number of crises, followed by those 
with no statutory objectives and those whose central banks narrowly focus on price stability 
as the single (or main) objective. On the other hand, those countries with objectives 
compatible a priori with price stability suffered the largest number of crises. 
Since these stylised facts may be biased by the number of observations in each group we use 
conditional probabilities to assess under which type of central bank objectives the 
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probability of a banking crisis is higher (Figure 4, dark column). As before, those countries 
whose central bank objectives do not include price stability have the lowest probability that a 
banking crisis may occur, followed closely by those with no statutory objectives and those 
who narrowly focus on price stability. The highest probability of crisis is still again for those 
countries whose central banks aim at price stability with other a priori compatible 
objectives, but followed closely by those with a priori conflictive objectives. 
 
 
We now look at the distribution of countries on the basis of their monetary policy strategies 
and crisis events during the same period. Figure 5 (light column) shows that countries whose 
central banks target the exchange rate are the ones with the highest percentage of crisis 
events, followed by those under monetary targeting. However, these stylised facts are clearly 
Figure 4: Distribution of crises by Central Bank Objectives
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biased by the larger number of observations of exchange rate targeting and, to a lower 
extent, monetary targeting. The conditional probabilities (dark column in the same Figure) 
actually show that the probability of a banking crisis event is substantially lower for 
countries whose central banks target the exchange rate, followed by monetary targeting. The 
highest probability is for those countries with inflation targeting. 
Obviously enough, these stylised facts do not allow us to extract any definitive conclusions, 
since we do not take into account important factors already identified in the empirical 
literature and previously revised in section 3 as affecting the probability of a banking crisis. 
This will be the objective of the next section. 
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of crises by monetary policy strategies
(percentage of total crises and conditional probability of crisis)
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7 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We apply a binary (logit) model to a panel of yearly data for 79 countries (27 industrial, 
32 emerging and 20 transition) over the years 1970-1999. We have an unbalanced panel 
because of the lack of data for some countries, particularly in the first years included in the 
sample (see table A1 in the Appendix). All in all, we have 1492 observations. 
We estimate the relationship between monetary policy design and financial instability, 
controlling for other relevant variables. The former is defined in terms of the central bank 
objectives, and index variable, and the monetary policy strategy (exchange rate, monetary or 
inflation targeting), which is reflected in three dummies. The latter focuses on the 
occurrence, or not, of a banking crisis, through a dummy, which takes the value of one if a 
crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The binary nature of the dependent variable explains the 
choice of a logit model for the estimation. 
We use a logistic distribution function to estimate whether, and to what extent, our 
regressors affect the probability of a banking crisis. The dependent variable equals zero in 
years and countries where there are no crises and it equals one in the country and year where 
there is a crisis. Given the logistic distribution, the probability of a banking crisis in period t 
can be expressed as follows: 
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The ratio of (1) over (2) is the odds ratio in favour of a crisis. Taking natural logs of this 
ratio, it should be clear that it is not only linear in 1-tX , but also linear in the parameters ß. 
Given (3), ß measures the change in the log-odds ratio for a unit change in 1-tX
16. 
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One of the main challenges we face is the heterogeneity inherent in a study with 
79 countries. We exclude the use of a conditional logit (fixed effects) because it would 
reduced the number of observations to a very low number and, even more importantly, it 
would have eliminated the information content of some countries that have not experienced 
any crisis as well as the few countries, especially transition countries, which have being in 
crisis during their whole sample period. Another crucial reason why we cannot use fixed 
effects is the small time variation of the objective variables. In particular, the index of central 
bank objectives mostly draws from surveys conducted for decades (only for the last decade 
we have more frequent data for some countries). We, thus, need to use random effects, even 
if it does not take into account the possibility of unobservable individual fixed effects being 
correlated with the regressors. We also use robust standard errors for our estimation. Finally, 
in view of the large standard deviation of some control variables, particularly inflation, real 
interest rates and credit growth (Table 3 in the Appendix), we substitute the 5% extreme 
values in the sample for a maximum value close to the 95th percentile (see the definition of 
variables in the Appendix). This should avoid outliers determining the results. 
                                                  
16 However, the marginal effect of a regressor on the dependent variable, which is the usual interpretation for coefficients in the ordinary 
least squares setup, is different from ß (although it still depends on it), namely: 
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Note that this expression will vary with 1-tX . In practice, the marginal effects are calculated at the means of the regressors. 
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Another issue is endogeneity. Once a crisis starts it is likely to affect the evolution of the 
macro, financial and institutional variables and even our objective variable, the monetary 
policy design. This might be true notwithstanding the findings of the empirical literature 
previously reviewed that money demand continues to be stable in the long run even after a 
systemic banking crisis. While this should reduce central bankers’ interest in changing the 
design of monetary policy, they could still decide to do so. To reduce the potential 
endogeneity problem, the empirical literature of banking crises generally eliminates the 
crisis observations beyond the first year (i.e., only gives the value of one to the starting year 
of the crisis and loses the rest of the crisis years). We follow the same approach and also lag 
all regressors by one period. 
These adjustments reduce the number of observations to 1181 from 1492, and the number of 
countries to 71 (27 industrial, 31 emerging and 13 transition) instead of the original 79 17. 
8 RESULTS 
With the methodology described above, we conduct one set of regressions, which can be 
considered the baseline, and five more sets of regressions, as robustness tests. Each set is 
composed of three specifications. The first includes the index of central bank objectives as 
the single objective variable and all macroeconomic, financial and institutional variables 
previously described as control variables. The second takes the three dummies for the 
monetary policy strategy and all control variables, but excludes the index of objectives to 
avoid interference between the two objective variables 18. The third takes both the index of 
                                                  
17 Seven of the eight countries lost are transition ones which had experienced crises throughout the period. Given that we take lags we need at 
least two observations to keep a country in the sample. 
18 Note, however, that we do not expect much interference since the correlations are low. In the most obvious case, between the dummy for 
the inflation targeting strategy and the index showing how important the price stability objective is, the correlation is only 0.19, and in any case the  
highest between the two objective variables (Table 4 in Appendix). 
 33 
central bank objectives and the three strategy dummies, as well as all control variables. It 
should be noted that, throughout the results, we show the coefficients of the regressions, not 
the marginal effect of each regressor on the probability of a banking crisis. This should be 
sufficient as we are mainly interested in the sign and significance of the coefficient. 
The first set –the baseline– takes all countries in the sample and a narrow definition of 
banking crisis –which only includes systemic events– as dependent variable. This should 
eliminate those crises stemming from one or a few banks’ mismanagement and not 
necessarily from macroeconomic, financial or institutional reasons. 
The results show the important role that central bank objectives play in determining the 
likelihood of a banking crisis in all specifications where it is included. The results for the 
monetary policy strategy are less clear-cut. Targeting the exchange rate is mildly significant 
in reducing the likelihood of a banking crisis in one specification. As for the control 
variables, the results were as expected: A higher economic growth and higher real GDP per 
capita significantly reduce the probability of a banking crisis in all specifications. Finally, 
more liquidity in the banks’ balance sheets, measured by the share of cash held by banks to 
bank assets, is found beneficial in all specifications. 
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Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0059 -0.0069 -0.0072
-(0.87) -(1.04) -(1.05)
Real interest rate 0.0084 0.0138 0.0105
(0.90) (1.45) (1.11)
GDP per capita -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 ***
-(6.98) -(7.18) -(6.43)
Real GDP growth -0.0614 ** -0.0720 *** -0.0624 **
-(2.22) -(2.66) -(2.23)
Domestic credit growth 0.0058 0.0049 0.0059
(0.91) (0.79) (0.93)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets -2.3800 * -3.6000 *** -2.3140 *
-(1.91) -(2.98) -(1.87)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.0070 -0.0059 -0.0044
-(0.24) -(0.21) -(0.16)
Net capital flows / GDP -0.1501 -0.1298 -0.1430
-(0.61) -(0.63) -(0.62)
Financial liberalization 0.4501 0.3914 0.5680
(1.23) (1.10) (1.51)
Deposit insurance -0.0017 0.2248 0.0730
(0.00) (0.51) (0.16)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability -1.6112 *** -1.2144 **
-(3.46) -(2.38)
Exchange rate target strategy -0.5283 * -0.3427
-(1.69) -(1.03)
Money target strategy -0.6486 -0.2482
-(1.54) -(0.55)
Inflation target strategy -0.7650 -0.6300
-(1.54) -(1.21)
Number of observations 1181 1181 1181
Wald Test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all 
coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients.
Table 1: Logit estimations for systemic banking crises in all countries 
(1) (2) (3)
 
We move to describing the three baseline specifications in more detail. The first one –with 
the central bank objectives as single objective variable– yields a highly significant negative 
impact (at 1% level) of narrow objectives (focused on price stability) on the probability of a 
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banking crisis (see column 1 of Table 1). This result is independent on whether a low 
inflation environment is actually achieved since there is a control variable accounting for this 
and, incidentally, is not found significant. A way to see that the index of central bank 
objectives is not picking up the effect of the inflation variable is the very low, and even 
negative, correlation between the objective index and inflation (Table 4 in the Appendix). 
In the second specification, with the monetary policy strategy as single objective variable, 
the results yield a negative coefficient for the exchange rate based strategy at a 10% 
significance level (column 2 of Table 1). In other words, among the three monetary policy 
strategies included (exchange rate, monetary based and inflation targeting), the former is 
found superior –albeit marginally– as concerns the probability of suffering from a banking 
crisis. This is in line with the result found by Domaç and Martinez-Peria (2000). 
The third and final specification –with all objective variables– confirms the negative 
coefficient of narrow central bank objectives (at 5% level) but not that of the exchange rate 
based strategy (see column 3 of Table 1). 
Given that the distinction between systemic and non systemic crises is not very clear-cut in 
the available surveys, we carry out the same regressions on a broader crisis definition as a 
robustness test  (see table 2). This includes both systemic and non-systemic crises as events 
in our binary model. The results hardly change for the central bank objectives and the 
control variables in the three model specifications. The main difference is that with this 
broader definition of crises, the choice of the monetary policy strategy offers clearer results. 
In fact, an exchange rate based strategy significantly reduces the likelihood of a crisis in all 
specifications where it was included. Additionally, as one would expect, financial 
liberalization significantly increases the likelihood of a banking crisis in two of the three 
specifications. Finally, in the second and third specifications, inflation reduces the 
probability of a crisis at a 10% confidence level. Although the result is weak and should be 
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taken with care, it could offer some preliminary empirical support to the recent literature 
strand which considers very low levels of inflation, in countries not used to price stability, as 
a source of euphoria and, thereby, financial instability. 
 
Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0091 -0.0120 * -0.0117 *
-(1.44) -(1.90) -(1.84)
Real interest rate 0.0086 0.0138 0.0108
(1.01) (1.57) (1.24)
GDP per capita -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 ***
-(6.27) -(6.45) -(5.64)
Real GDP growth -0.0786 *** -0.0783 *** -0.0706 ***
-(3.13) -(3.17) -(2.83)
Domestic credit growth 0.0043 0.0050 0.0058
(0.76) (0.90) (1.02)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets -2.0780 ** -2.6834 *** -1.6418
-(2.00) -(2.61) -(1.62)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.0101 -0.0094 -0.0082
-(0.36) -(0.36) -(0.32)
Net capital flows / GDP -0.0429 -0.0826 -0.0686
-(0.20) -(0.48) -(0.36)
Financial liberalization 0.6229 ** 0.4991 0.6249 **
(2.07) (1.64) (2.01)
Deposit insurance -0.2972 -0.2026 -0.2621
-(0.85) -(0.58) -(0.75)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability -1.4255 *** -1.0599 ***
-(3.85) -(2.73)
Exchange rate target strategy -0.8249 *** -0.6600 **
-(3.26) -(2.53)
Money target strategy -0.1902 0.0322
-(0.60) (0.10)
Inflation target strategy -0.6446 -0.4084
-(1.54) -(0.96)
Number of observations 1115 1115 1115
Wald Test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all 
coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients.
Table 2: Logit estimations for systemic and non-systemic banking crises in all countries 
(1) (2) (3)
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We now split the sample in three groups of countries, industrial, emerging and transition, to 
check whether the results are robust to the different country groups. We use only systemic 
crises as dependent variable. 
As before, in the case of industrial countries, central bank objectives focused on price 
stability significantly reduce the likelihood of crisis events, but only in the first specification 
(column 1 of Table 3), and at a lower confidence level. In addition, no monetary policy 
strategy appears superior to the others as regards the occurrence of a banking crisis 
(column 2 of Table 3). As for the control variables, only the real GDP per capita is found 
significant, with the correct sign. 
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Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0595 -0.0486 -0.0536
-(0.76) -(0.66) -(0.70)
Real interest rate 0.0942 0.0923 0.1007
(1.10) (1.08) (1.24)
GDP per capita -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0002 **
-(2.18) -(2.38) -(2.18)
Real GDP growth -0.1672 -0.1895 -0.1710
-(1.15) -(1.43) -(1.20)
Domestic credit growth 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0001
(0.08) (0.04) (0.00)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets -4.1366 -5.6206 -3.6587
-(0.64) -(0.81) -(0.56)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.1187 -0.1004 -0.0524
-(0.33) -(0.27) -(0.15)
Net capital flows / GDP -0.2406 -2.4806 -0.3011
-(0.03) -(0.33) -(0.04)
Financial liberalization -0.4822 -0.6295 -0.3686
-(0.56) -(0.74) -(0.43)
Deposit insurance 0.2062 0.2197 0.1943
(0.24) (0.26) (0.22)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability -1.7389 * -1.6127
-(1.81) -(1.63)
Exchange rate target strategy -0.5012 -0.2209
-(0.71) -(0.30)
Money target strategy -0.3345 0.0222
-(0.44) (0.03)
Inflation target strategy -33.8510 -37.5597
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of observations 613 613 613
Wald Test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all 
coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients.
Table 3: Logit estimations for systemic banking crises in industrial countries 
(1) (2) (3)
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In the emerging country group the results are similar to the baseline one (Table 4). In the 
first specification, countries which narrowly focus on price stability tend to suffer from 
fewer banking crises, other things given. In the second one, money target seems slightly 
superior to the other monetary policy strategies. As in the baseline, real GDP per capita and 
the liquidity held by banks substantially lower the likelihood of a banking crisis. Finally, 
higher real interest rates appear to increase the probability of banking crises at a 10% 
significance level in two of the three specifications. 
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Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0020
-(0.07) -(0.11) -(0.23)
Real interest rate 0.0188 0.0224 * 0.0193 *
(1.60) (1.95) (1.65)
GDP per capita -0.0004 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0004 ***
-(3.75) -(3.96) -(3.14)
Real GDP growth -0.0561 -0.0570 * -0.0522
-(1.53) -(1.66) -(1.46)
Domestic credit growth 0.0017 0.0005 0.0014
(0.19) (0.06) (0.15)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets -2.9402 ** -3.8913 *** -2.9789 **
-(1.95) -(2.87) -(2.00)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0015
-(0.10) -(0.02) -(0.06)
Net capital flows / GDP -0.1057 -0.0606 -0.0815
-(0.43) -(0.27) -(0.34)
Financial liberalization 0.0440 0.1393 0.1670
(0.10) (0.32) (0.36)
Deposit insurance 0.3255 0.7812 0.5663
(0.60) (1.48) (0.96)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability -1.1821 ** -0.8043
-(2.08) -(1.31)
Exchange rate target strategy -0.3556 -0.2991
-(0.91) -(0.67)
Money target strategy -1.0383 * -0.5586
-(1.73) -(0.76)
Inflation target strategy -0.7162 -0.5783
-(1.26) -(0.96)
Number of observations 518 518 518
Wald Test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all 
coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients.
Table 4: Logit estimations for systemic banking crises in emerging countries 
(1) (2) (3)
 
Finally, the same exercise is conducted for transition countries. This is the only case in 
which having central bank objectives which narrowly focus on price stability does not 
reduce the probability of banking crises in a significant way (Table 5). Nevertheless, the 
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results for the transition country group should be taken with care, due to the small number of 
observations available. The structural break in the early 1990s meant that we could only take 
them from the early 1990s, rather than from the1970s as for the rest of the sample. Since the 
tests of joint significance are very poor, we exclude a few control variables to increase the 
degrees of freedom. In particular, we exclude the two dummies representing institutional 
variables (columns 4-6 of Table 5). In this case, the choice of an exchange rate based 
strategy is clearly superior, in terms of the likelihood of a crisis both in all specifications 
where included. It is interesting to note the marked differences in results for transition 
economies and the rest of the sample: choosing an exchange rate strategy appears to be more 
important for them, in terms of financial stability, than focusing on price stability, while the 
opposite is true for the full sample. In addition, the growth of domestic credit increases the 
probability of a crisis and net capital flows reduce it. 
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Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0159 -0.0692 -0.0780 0.0013 0.0052 -0.0056
-(0.68) -(0.93) -(0.92) (0.12) (0.41) -(0.34)
Real interest rate -0.0140 0.0297 0.0886 -0.0019 0.0243 0.0367
-(0.51) (0.45) (0.94) -(0.10) (1.01) (1.23)
GDP per capita -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
-(0.31) -(0.73) -(0.02) -(0.64) (0.09) -(0.63)
Real GDP growth 0.1542 0.2834 0.3247 0.1456 0.2231 0.2609 *
(1.17) (1.29) (1.34) (1.65) (1.62) (1.63)
Domestic credit growth 0.0259 0.0211 0.0486 0.0226 * 0.0300 ** 0.0219 *
(1.45) (1.47) (1.53) (1.75) (2.30) (1.66)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets 7.7069 14.3156 23.6004 1.6448 0.4500 0.7752
(1.30) (1.20) (1.34) (0.59) (0.14) (0.22)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.4810 0.0370 0.9332 -0.4312 0.3085 0.2477
-(0.60) (0.03) (0.62) -(0.68) (0.44) (0.31)
Net capital flows / GDP -4.6147 -30.3405 * -34.0572 -6.9050 -12.0739 -21.7375 **
-(0.40) -(1.73) -(1.53) -(0.86) -(1.39) -(1.93)
Financial liberalization 5.6562 11.4704 21.9029
(1.08) (1.29) (1.40)
Deposit insurance -1.5454 -1.4148 -0.8872
-(0.81) -(0.86) -(0.57)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability -8.2991 -11.7726 -1.7827 5.4542
-(1.29) -(1.27) -(1.07) (1.54)
Exchange rate target strategy -12.1139 -15.2821 -3.2477 ** -6.7013 **
-(1.51) -(1.31) -(1.92) -(2.15)
Money target strategy -1.3984 -1.5860 -0.5359 -1.5787
-(0.86) -(0.78) -(0.50) -(1.22)
Inflation target strategy -1.4525 -4.4284 -0.7958 -0.2033
-(0.94) -(1.26) -(0.72) -(0.17)
Number of observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
Wald Test (p-value) (0.75) (0.76) (0.92) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) 
robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
Table 5: Logit estimations for systemic banking crises in transition countries 
(4) (5) (6)
 
 
We now introduce two important institutional variables, which are directly related to the 
objective of our study: the degree of central bank independence and the location of the 
responsibility for bank regulation and supervision. When controlling for these two variables 
(Table 6), central bank independence significantly reduces the likelihood of a banking crises. 
The central bank objectives are not significant any longer, which is not strange if we 
consider the high collinearity between the two variables (0.47). This is because having 
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narrower objectives increases the degree of central bank independence in the index used in 
this study. 
The exchange rate-based monetary policy strategy is no longer even mildly significant as in 
the baseline exercise. The results for the control variables are practically the same as in the 
baseline, namely the GDP per capita, real GDP growth and banks’ liquidity reduce the 
likelihood of a crisis and financial liberalization increases it. 
Finally, an interesting result drawn from this set of regressions is that locating bank 
regulation and supervision at the central bank significantly reduces the likelihood of a 
banking crisis in all model specifications. It should be noted that the relevance of this finding 
is limited by potentially large endogeneity problems. These cannot be minimized as for the 
other regressors because the dummy variable representing the location of regulation and 
supervision is time-invariant. In fact, available information does not allow including changes 
in the location of responsibilities for regulation and supervision over time, even if they have 
taken place, and perhaps even as a consequence of a crisis. 
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Variable
Control variables
Inflation -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0015
-(0.12) -(0.27) -(0.23)
Real interest rate 0.0119 0.0116 0.0121
(1.39) (1.35) (1.39)
GDP per capita -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
-(6.63) -(6.14) -(6.09)
Real GDP growth -0.0468 * -0.0478 * -0.0481 *
-(1.76) -(1.75) -(1.76)
Domestic credit growth 0.0051 0.0055 0.0054
(0.85) (0.92) (0.89)
Cash held by banks / Bank assets -2.2684 ** -2.2127 ** -2.2913 **
-(2.09) -(2.04) -(2.05)
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.0099 -0.0086 -0.0077
-(0.37) -(0.33) -(0.30)
Net capital flows / GDP -0.1495 -0.1428 -0.1405
-(0.60) -(0.58) -(0.58)
Financial liberalization 0.5774 * 0.6143 * 0.6137 *
(1.72) (1.80) (1.79)
Deposit insurance 0.0026 0.0264 0.0583
(0.01) (0.06) (0.14)
Objective variables
Central bank focus on price stability 0.0965 0.1756
(0.19) (0.34)
Exchange rate target strategy -0.1526 -0.1537
-(0.51) -(0.51)
Money target strategy -0.1817 -0.2141
-(0.47) -(0.54)
Inflation target strategy -0.1085 -0.1106
-(0.22) -(0.23)
Central bank independence -1.6935 ** -1.4338 ** -1.5910 *
-(2.11) -(2.11) -(1.93)
Central bank supervision of financial system -1.0826 *** -1.0241 *** -1.0359 ***
-(3.74) -(3.50) -(3.52)
Number of observations 1181 1181 1181
Wald Test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Logit estimates with random effects. All variables in first lags. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Tests: z-statistics (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity; Wald test measures the joint significance of all 
coefficients and it is distributed as a Chi squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients.
Table 6: Logit estimations for systemic banking crises in all countries controlling for central bank 
independence and central bank supervision of financial system  
(1) (2) (3)
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9 CONCLUSIONS  
Building upon the existing empirical literature on the factors behind financial stability, we 
assess what is the role of monetary policy design in determining the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. 
With a sample of yearly data for 79 countries for the period 1970 to 1999, we find evidence 
that the choice of the central bank objectives significantly influences the probability that a 
banking crisis may occur. In particular, having narrow central bank objectives , focused on 
price stability, reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis. This result is robust, in general, to 
broad and narrow definitions of banking crises (systemic and non-systemic or only systemic) 
and to different country groups, except for transition countries. The results for this latter 
group, however, should be taken with care due to the relatively small number of 
observations on which they are drawn. Finally, when including the degree of central bank 
independence, this becomes highly significant  in reducing the likelihood of a banking crisis 
while the central bank objectives lose their significance. This is probably due to the high 
collinearity between the two variables, being the central bank objectives part of the 
independence index. 
As for the monetary policy strategy, exchange rate targeting is found beneficial when a 
broad definition of banking crises is chosen and for the group of transition countries, but not 
for industrial and emerging countries. This finding would support the choice of re latively 
fixed exchange rate regimes in countries in transition to avoid banking crises, but the result 
could change if the definition of financial instability were expanded to currency crises or 
other asset prices. 
Finally, locating bank regulatory and supervisory responsibilities at the central bank 
significantly reduces the probability of banking crises. This is an interesting result for an 
issue which has been long debated in the literature and for which no consensus exists, but it 
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should be taken with caution because of obvious endogeneity problems stemming from the 
time invariability of the variable representing the location of supervision. 
On the basis of these preliminary, but encouraging results, we intend to improve and extend 
our analysis in several directions. First, the relation between the central bank monetary 
policy intentions (in terms of objectives and strategy) and its achievements (the inflation 
outcome) is worth exploring. This could be achieved by introducing other important aspects 
which affects the central bank design and the degree of independence, for instance the rule 
of law, as recently shown by Eijffinger and Stadhousers (2003). Second, different angles of 
financial stability, other than the occurrence of banking crises, would warrant attention. This 
would imply using broader definitions of financial stability as dependent variable, measuring 
the fragility of financial institutions and “excessive” asset price movements. 
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APPENDIX 
Data sources and definitions of variables 
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study, as well as the explanation of any 
change we have introduced. The data is annual and it covers the period 1970-99. 
Dependent variable 
· Systemic and non-systemic banking crises dummy: equals one during episodes identified 
as in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). They present information on 117 systemic banking 
crises (defined as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) that have occurred since 
the late 1970s in 93 countries and 51 smaller non-systemic banking crises in 45 countries 
during that period. The information on crises is cross-checked with that of Domaç and 
Martinez-Peria (2000) and with IMF staff reports and financial news. 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Domaç and Martinez Peria (2000). 
Objective variables: 
· Central Bank focus on price stability: measures to what extent statutory objectives do 
provide the central bank with a clear focus on price stability following the approach of 
Cukierman et al. (1992). Statutory monetary objectives may be potentially conflicting 
with price stability when objectives such as employment or growth are stated separately 
without being qualified by statements such as “without prejudice to monetary or price 
stability”. Financial stability objectives are not interpreted as potentially conflicting with 
monetary stability. The classification of objectives differs somewhat from Cukierman’s 
and it is more similar to that of Mahadeva and Sterne (2000). The variable takes the 
following values: 0 (only goals other than price stability); 0.25 (no statutory objectives); 
0.5 (price stability with other conflicting objectives); 0.75 (price stability + financial 
stability and non-conflicting monetary stability objectives); and 1 (only goal is price, 
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monetary or currency stability)19. The list of objectives and countries is available by 
decades, so we have assumed it constant through every year of each decade except for 
the most recent years where the information on some countries has been updated with 
other sources, mainly Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) but also Cukierman et al. (2002) for 
transition countries. 
Source: For the 1970s and the 1980s, Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). For the 
1990s, Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and. Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). 
· Monetary policy strategies: these three variables (Exchange rate target, Money target 
and Inflation target) are dummies that equal one during periods in which targets for 
these variables were used according to the chronology of the Bank of England survey of 
monetary frameworks, in Mahadeva and Sterne (2000). Since it provides a chronology 
for the 1990s, we have complemented it with information from other sources for the 
previous years. Regarding exchange rate arrangements, we use classifications of 
exchange rate strategies in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Kuttner and Posen (2001), and 
Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002) for Latin America countries. Data for monetary and 
inflation targets were complemented with the information taken from Kuttner and Posen 
(2001) and Carare and Stone (2003). It should be noted that some judgement has gone 
into the classification of regimes. 
Source: Mahadeva and Sterne (2000),  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Kuttner and Posen 
(2001), Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002) and Carare and Stone (2003). 
· Central Bank Independence: measures to what extent the central banks are legally 
independent according to their charters, following the approach of Cukierman et al.  
(1992). This variable goes from 0 (least independent) to 1 (most independent) and is 
taken from Cukierman et al. (1992), for the 1970s and 1980s, and from Mahadeva and 
                                                  
19 Cukierman’s classification distinguishes between “price stability is the only objective”, rated 0.8, and “price stability is the major or only 
objective in the charter, and the central bank has the final word in case of conflict with other government objectives”, rated 1. 
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Sterne (2000) and Cukierman et al. (2002) for the 1990s. Without getting into too much 
detail (see the references in case of interest), and disregarding some minor differences of 
construction, both indexes are more or less coherent and comparable as both try to 
cluster the same important issues for central bank independence (e.g., the appointment, 
dismissal and term of office of Governor; policy formulation; objectives; and limitations 
on lending to the government). As in the case of the variable of focus on price stability, 
the index of independence is assumed to be constant through every year of each decade. 
Source: For the 1970s and the 1980s, Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). For the 
1990s, Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). 
· Central Bank Supervision of Financial System : this variable is a dummy which takes 
the value 1 for countries where the Central Bank is responsible for the supervision of the 
financial system and takes 0 otherwise. This variable is not time-varying; it stems from a 
survey conducted by the IMF in 1993 where all member countries where asked to inform 
of which institution was responsible for banking regulation and supervision in their 
respective countries. The results of the survey are shown in Tuya and Zamalloa (1994). 
Source: Tuya and Zamalloa (1994). 
 
Control Variables 
Macroeconomic variables 
· Inflation: percentage change in the GDP deflator. (Since the value for the 95% 
percentile is 106.3%, but the variance is extremely high due to several cases of 
hyperinflations, we have substituted all values above 150% for 150%). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, line 99bir. 
· Real Interest Rate: Nominal interest rate minus inflation in the same period, calculated 
as the percentage change in the GDP deflator. (Since the value for the 5% percentile is 
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-30% and for the 95% percentile is 21.2%, but the variance is extremely high, we have 
substituted all values above 50% for 50% and those below –50% for 50%). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Where available, 
money market rate (line 60B); otherwise, the commercial bank deposit interest rate (line 
60l); otherwise, a rate charged by the Central Bank to domestic banks such as the 
discount rate (line 60). 
· Net Capital Flows to GDP: Capital Account plus Financial Account + Net Errors and 
Omissions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, lines (78bcd + 
78bjd +78cad). 
· Real GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars : this variable is expressed in US dollars instead 
of PPP for reasons of data availability. GDP per capita in PPP was available only for two 
points in time. 
Source: The World Bank, World Tables; and EBRD, Transition Report, for some 
transition countries. 
· Real GDP growth : percentage change in GDP Volume (1995=100). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (line 99bvp) 
where available; otherwise, The World Bank, World Tables; and EBRD, Transition 
Report, for some transition countries. 
Financial variables 
· Domestic Credit growth: percentage change in domestic credit, claims on private sector. 
(Since the value for the 95% percentile is 112.2%, but the variance is extremely high, we 
have substituted all values above 150% for 150%). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, line 32d. 
 51 
· Bank Cash to total assets: Reserves of Deposit Money Banks divided by total assets of 
Deposit Money Banks. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, line 20 divided 
by lines (22a + 22b + 22c +22d +22f). 
· Bank Foreign Liabilities to Foreign Assets: deposit money banks foreign liabilities to 
foreign assets. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, lines 
(26c+26cl) divided by line 21. 
Institutional variables 
· Financial Liberalization: this variable is a dummy which takes the value 1 for countries 
and years where the domestic financial sector (mainly, the interest rates) have been 
liberalized and 0 otherwise. This variable stems from several chronologies of financial 
liberalization: Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) for 59 countries over the period 1973-1998, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for a panel of 53 countries for the period 1980-
1995, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) for 28 countries since 1973 (we have take the 
year for the liberalization of the domestic financial sector) and Williamson and Mahar 
(1998) for 34 countries over the period 1973-1996. 
Source: Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Williamson and Mahar (1998). 
· Deposit Insurance : this variable is a dummy which takes the value 1 for countries where 
there is an explicit deposit insurance system, since the year of its enactment, and 0 
otherwise. This variable stems from a World Bank database compiled by Demirgürç-
Kunt and Sabaci (2002). Source: Demirgürç-Kunt and Sabaci (2002). 
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Country name Years Country name Years
Industrial
Australia 1971-1999 Honduras 1978-1997
Austria 1970-1996 Indonesia 1981-1999
Belgium 1975-1997 Kenya 1975-1999
Canada 1970-1999 Malaysia 1974-1999
Cyprus 1976-1999 Malta 1971-1998
Denmark 1975-1999 Mexico 1982-1999
Finland 1975-1998 Mongolia 1993-1999
France 1975-1997 Nicaragua 1988-1996
Germany 1970-1998 Nigeria 1977-1999
Greece 1975-1999 Paraguay 1988-1999
Hong Kong, China 1991-1999 Peru 1977-1999
Iceland 1976-1999 South Africa 1970-1999
Ireland 1974-1998 Tanzania 1976-1999
Israel 1979-1999 Thailand 1976-1997
Italy 1970-1998 Turkey 1974-1997
Japan 1977-1999 Uganda 1981-1999
Korea, Rep. 1976-1999 Uruguay 1978-1999
Netherlands 1970-1997 Venezuela, RB 1970-1999
New Zealand 1972-1999 Zambia 1985-1999
Norway 1975-1999 Transition
Portugal 1975-1999 Albania 1995-1998
Singapore 1972-1999 Armenia 1993-1999
Spain 1975-1997 Bulgaria 1992-1997
Sweden 1970-1999 Kazakhstan 1995-1999
Switzerland 1977-1999 Croatia 1994-1998
United Kingdom 1970-1999 Czech Republic 1994-1997
United States 1970-1999 Estonia 1993-1999
Developing Georgia 1996-1997
Argentina 1981-1999 Hungary 1983-1997
Bahamas 1985-1995 Kyrgyz Rep. 1996-1998
Barbados 1970-1995 Latvia 1994-1999
Bolivia 1976-1999 Lithuania 1994-1999
Botswana 1976-1999 Macedonia 1996-1999
Brazil 1981-1999 Moldova 1994-1999
Chile 1977-1999 Poland 1990-1999
China 1985-1999 Romania 1993-1999
Colombia 1970-1999 Russian Federation 1994-1999
Costa Rica 1970-1999 Slovak Republic 1994-1997
Ecuador 1975-1999 Slovenia 1993-1999
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1976-1999 Ukraine 1994-1998
Ghana 1971-1999
Table A1: Countries and years included
 
Country name Systemic Non-systemic Country name Systemic Non-systemic
Industrial
Australia 1989-92 Honduras no crises no crises
Austria no crises no crises Indonesia 1992-97,1997-
Belgium no crises no crises Kenya 1985-89,1992,1993-95 1996-
Canada 1983-85 Malaysia 1997- 1985-88
Cyprus not in sample not in sample Malta not in sample not in sample
Denmark 1987-92 Mexico 1981-82,1994-97
Finland 1991-94 Mongolia not in sample not in sample
France 1994-95 Nicaragua 1988-96
Germany 1978-79 Nigeria 1990s 1997
Greece 1991-95 Paraguay 1995-99
Hong Kong, China 1982-83, 1983-86,1998 Peru 1983-90
Iceland 1985-86,1993 South Africa 1977,1989
Ireland no crises no crises Tanzania 1988-
Israel 1977-83 Thailand 1983-87,1997-
Italy 1990-95 Turkey 1982-85 1994
Japan 1992- Uganda 1994-
Korea, Rep. 1997- Uruguay 1981-85
Netherlands no crises no crises Venezuela, RB 1994-99 1978,1981,1982,1985,1986
New Zealand 1987-90 Zambia 1995
Norway 1987-93 Transition
Portugal no crises no crises Albania 1992-
Singapore 1982 Armenia 1994-96
Spain 1977-85 Bulgaria 1991-97
Sweden 1990-94 Croatia 1996
Switzerland no crises no crises Czech Republic 1997-
United Kingdom 1974-76,1984,1991,1995 Estonia 1992-95 1998
United States 1980-83 1980-91 Georgia 1991-
Developing Hungary 1991-95
Argentina 1980-82,1989-90,1995 Kazakhstan not in sample not in sample
Bahamas not in sample not in sample Kyrgyz Rep. 1990s
Barbados not in sample not in sample Latvia 1995-96,1998-99
Bolivia 1986-87,1994- Lithuania 1995-96
Botswana 1994-95 Macedonia 1993-94
Brazil 1990,1994-99 Moldova not in sample not in sample
Chile 1976,1981-87 Poland 1990s
China 1990s Romania 1990-
Colombia 1982-87 Russian Federation 1995,1998-99
Costa Rica 1987 1994- Slovak Republic 1991-
Ecuador 1980-82,1996- Slovenia 1992-94
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980-85 1991-95 Ukraine 1997-98
Ghana 1982-89 1997-
Table A2: Countries and crises included. 1970-1999.
This table presents the periods of systemic and non-systemic banking crisis based on the information provided by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Domaç and Martinez Peria (2000).
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 Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Crisis dummy 1492 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Inflation 1492 72.64 562.01 -4.00 11750.00
Real interest rate 1492 8.62 626.98 -11680.85 14155.99
Real GDP per capita 1492 6925.07 4976.04 125.20 21487.30
Real GDP growth 1492 3.46 4.67 -38.29 52.55
Domestic credit growth 1492 87.91 800.47 -55.71 18939.19
Cash held by banks / Bank assets 1492 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.78
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets 1492 1.88 4.26 0.00 85.25
Net capital flows / GDP 1492 0.00 0.71 -12.99 8.07
Financial liberalization 1492 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Deposit insurance 1492 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Central bank focus on price stability 1492 0.61 0.31 0.00 1.00
Exchange rate target strategy 1492 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
Money target strategy 1492 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Inflation target strategy 1492 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Central bank independence 1492 0.48 0.23 0.00 0.97
Central bank supervision 1492 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Table A3: Descriptive statistics of the regression variables
Note: For an explanation on the construction and modification of the variables see main text and the 
description in this Appendix.  
 
Crisis Inflation Real 
int. 
GDP 
pc
Real 
GDP 
Dom. 
credit 
Cash/ 
assets  
Foreign 
Liab.
Capital 
flows
Price 
stab.
Exch. 
Target
Money 
Target
Inflation 
target
CB 
Superv.
Finan. 
Liberal.
Depos. 
Insur.
CB 
Indep.
Crisis dummy 1
Inflation 0.11 1
Real interest rate 0.05 -0.19 1
Real GDP per capita -0.16 -0.11 0.02 1
Real GDP growth -0.11 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 1
Domestic credit growth 0.08 0.92 -0.20 -0.09 -0.12 1
Cash held by banks / Bank assets 0.08 0.10 -0.06 -0.44 0.03 0.07 1
Foreign liabilities / Foreign assets -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 1
Net capital flows / GDP -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 1
Central bank focus on price stability 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 0.00 1
Exchange rate target strategy -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.03 1
Money target strategy 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.10 -0.11 1
Inflation target strategy 0.19 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.19 0.02 0.18 1
Central bank supervision 0.03 0.10 0.03 -0.28 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.11 1
Financial liberalization 0.07 0.00 0.31 0.27 -0.10 0.04 -0.21 -0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.14 0.23 0.26 -0.10 1
Deposit insurance 0.00 -0.15 0.13 0.47 -0.09 -0.14 -0.28 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.23 0.05 -0.33 0.41 1
Central bank independence 0.01 -0.19 0.16 0.23 0.01 -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.47 -0.04 0.14 0.33 -0.06 0.41 0.27 1
Table A4 : Correlation matrix of the regression variables
Note: For an explanation on the construction and modification of the variables see main text and the description in this Appendix.
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